On the night of 12/13 May 1968 the Mortar of 1st Battalion, The Royal Australian Regiment part of 102 Field Battery and part regimental headquarters, 12 Field Regiment, Royal Australian Artillery, were overrun by an estimated enemy battalion. Since then there has been a lot of discussion over a few beers, in fire support bases and on TEWTs as to what exactly happened that night and afterwards. To set the record straight I would like to give a brief outline of events as they occurred, and which affected the Mortar Platoon of 1 RAR-the lessons to be learnt can perhaps be deduced by the reader.

 

To fully understand the tactical situation at this it is necessary to consider the enemy:.

His Strategic Aim. North Vietnam's strategic aim was clearly to win at the Paris Peace talks what she had been unable to win militarily-ousting the United States and taking over South Vietnam. To strengthen her bargaining position she needed a victory capable of psychological exploitation on the world scene. Saigon was the obvious target and while military activity was directed to keeping pressure on all cities and base complexes, Saigon was the main center of attention.

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His Tactical Aim. From early May 1968, enemy forces were committed to heavy sustained action to the West, North West and North of Saigon. 9 VC Division (271, 272 and 273 VC Regiments) was fully committed West and North West of Saigon and had suffered heavy casualties. 7 NVA Division (141 and 165 NVA Regiments) had been contacted in strength North of Saigon on 8 May. 165 NVA Regiment suffered heavy casualties but no identified contact had been made with 141 NVA Regiment. 5 VC Division (274 and 275 VC Regiments) had not yet been contacted in strength although reports indicated their presence North and North East of Saigon. Other independent enemy main force regiments were active close to the city of Saigon. All indications pointed to a continuation of a determined enemy effort to attack Saigon. Enemy artillery units (both rocket and mortar) were operating with companies widely dispersed or under operational control of different infantry regiments. The enemy mission was to disrupt normal activity in Saigon and render governmental control impossible. This was to be done by:

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• * Attacks to close Tan Son Nhut and Bien Hoa airfields.

• * Rocket attacks and terrorist activity against civilians.

• * Occupation of key government centers.

• * Destruction of major installations, headquarters and ammunition dumps, petrol and oil storage areas and key bridges.

• * Assassination of important military and civilian leaders of government

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Since the TET offensive (three months before), major reinforcement and retraining of both VC and NVA units had been necessary. Many units had been withdrawn to Cambodia for this purpose. Other formations were reinforced by infiltration groups direct from North Vietnam. A total of eleven enemy Main Force regiments were committed in the attack against Saigon/Cholon and nearby areas. Overall enemy casualties within III Corps Tactical Zone during the period 4-9 May 1968 were 4135 KIA (BC).

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At this stage eleven allied brigades were deployed in or around Saigon. Most of these were in the "rocket belt" (an area 6,000-11,000 metres/out of Saigon Bien Hoa, which was the optimum launch area for the NVA rockets). Despite this there were several major incidents in Saigon in the period 5-12 May 1968, including rocket and ground attacks and the closure of Tan Son Nhut airport for some hours. 1st Australian Task-Force (1 ATF) was operating with I and 2 RAR 10 miles East of Long Binh on Highway One in Long Khan Province and 3 RAR in Phuoc Tuy Province. On 10 May 3 RAR relieved 2 RAR. The same day Second Field Force Vietnam (II FFV) requested that I ATF be deployed into AO Surfers to destroy enemy moving through this area. This area was North of Saigon on the southern edge of War Zone D.

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I ATF commander's concept of operations was:

• * 3 RAR to land by helicopter on 12 May 1968 to secure FSPB CORAL for the fly in of 1 RAR and then move to establish blocking positions and patrol in the West of A0 Surfers.

• * 12 Field Regiment, Head quarters 1 ATF and 1 RAR fly-in and establish FSPB CORAL on I2 May 1968.

• * Task Force Maintenance Area (TEMA), heavy artillery and armour join on 13 May 1968.

• * 1 RAR block and patrol to the East on 13 May 1968.

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The tasks of I RAR and 3 RAR were as follows:

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I RAR

• * Establish 102 Field Battery in FSPB CORAL

• * Clear Route 16 from FSPB CORAL to Tan Uyen and secure it for convoy movement on 13 May 1968

• * Establish blocking positions and patrol in AO Bondi to interdict enemy withdrawal routes from the South and South West.

3 RAR

• * Secure a LZ for the fly-in of the remainder of 3 RAR and 1 RAR.

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• * Establish 161 Field Battery in FSPB CORAL.

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• * Provide one company and one section of mortars for the protection of FSPB CORAL.

• * Establish blocking positions and patrol in AO Manly to interdict enemy withdrawal routes from the South and South West.

The fly-in to FSPB CORAL commenced early on 12 May 1968-the LZ initially being secured by a United States infantry company. The reconnaissance parties of 12 Field Regiment, 102 Field Battery, 161 Field Battery and the Advance Party of 1 RAR were on the ground by midday 12 May 1968. Before his departure the OC of the US company warned-"Charlie will come looking for you-you don't have to find him".

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The reconnaissance party then set about siting the FSPB. The commander of the reconnaissance party considered that they were in the wrong area and decided to move about 1,200 metres North East. As the reconnaissance party was moving off, Chinooks, with the 161 Field Battery guns underslung, arrived and demanded smoke to be thrown to indicate the gun position. The situation was explained to them and they were asked to wait and put back the fly-in timings. This, however, was not possible, and the BK 161 Field Battery was forced to accept his guns at the original LZ. The remainder of the reconnaissance party moved on to the North East.

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All companies of 1 RAR had deployed into company AO's by last light on 12 May 1968, and the defence works at FSPB CORAL had been developed as follows;

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12 Field Regiment Headquarters. This Headquarters was responsible for the defence of the FSPB. The command post was dug-in with two feet of overhead protection; and individual shell scrapes were dug and machine guns were sited.

102 Field Battery. The bunds of the three forward guns had been completed by the Battery's bulldozer, and individual shell scrapes were dug. A separate bund for reserve ammunition was also completed. The guns were laid on a center of arc of 1600 mils.

1 RAR Headquarters Due to fly-in delays, Headquarters 1 RAR was not concentrated until about 1700 hours. A decision was made by the Commanding Officer I RAR at 1600 hours that his Headquarters would remain in the area of FSPB CORAL, and not move as planned some 2000 metres North East, until the following day. Arrangements were also made for Headquarters I RAR to secure an area East of 102 Field Battery, while Headquarters 3 RAR, D Company 3 RAR less elements with 161 Field Battery to the West, and advance elements of Head-quarters 1 ATF secured FSPB CORAL. In the Headquarters 1 RAR location individual weapon pits and a command post were dug but no locations had overhead cover due to lack of time and defence stores.

Mortar Platoon 1 RAR. The Mortar Platoon had four mortars on the ground. They were dug-in to two feet and were on a center of arc of 1600 mils. Individual shell scrapes were dug and the command post was in stage one of development.

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The defence of the FSPB was not fully developed for the following reasons:

• * D Company 3 RA R was expected to close-in to the FSPB and assist in its defence. As a result no Claymores were sited in the FSPB area.

• * Machine guns were sited and their arcs Co-ordinated but these details were not recorded by the FSPB defence command post.

• * I RAR mortars did not arrive on the position until approximately 1700 hours and there was no FSPB defence co-ordinating conference.

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The initial contact with the enemy occurred at about 2400 hours when they walked into a D Company I RAR ambush sited about 2500 metres North of FSPB CORAL. The enemy employed RPG's in a tree burst role as a counter-ambush drill and inflicted approximately 11 casualties on 11 Platoon.

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Shortly after this, at about 0005 hours, an enemy reconnaissance party probed the Mortar Platoon position, and as a result of this contact there were three enemy killed in action. Confusion at this stage on the internal defence radio net was an indication of things to come. The call signs of stations on the net were not known by all users, however this was ultimately sorted out.

Later the lack of detail held by the FSPB defence command post was particularly evident when the command post asked the Mortar Platoon to verify whether or not the Mortar Platoon machine guns were firing green tracer at them. The tracer was in fact marking enemy assault lines.

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At approximately 0145 hours, the enemy launched a brief but heavy RPG and mortar attack on FSPB CORAL. This was closely followed by a ground attack of approximately battalion strength. The enemy moved in about 50 metres behind the fire support and overran the mortar position and one gun of 102 Field Battery in the first five minutes.

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The first warning of this attack came from Corporal Hickey, a section second-in-command (later killed in action), who alerted the Platoon second-in-command- as the mortar attack began, and stated that he was one of the picquets and that there were about 400 enemy 50 metres away and gibbering. This information was immediately passed to I RAR command post on the Battalion command net, and on the internal defence net to the FSPB defence command post.

161 Field Battery was requested by 1 RAR command post to fire a close DF in front of the Mortar Platoon. This was done with remarkable speed, but by the time fire was adjusted close in, some enemy were about 10-1 5 metres from the mortar position which was subjected to heavy RPG and small arms fire.

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On the mortar position every man was standing-to. An initial attempt was made to fire the mortars on maximum elevation but this was unsuccessful as the enemy was very close to the position at the time. The crews were engaged by heavy small arms fire and, as they had no other protection. had no alternative but to occupy their weapon pits and employ their personal weapons.

As the enemy moved through the mortar position they engaged all "hutchies" with RPG's-fortunately the command post shelter was removed just in time. The enemy seemed quite confused about finding the mortar position. They appeared not to know what to do with the mortars they had captured. Eventually some started to fire the mortars in the direction of the guns (a sweep of the area later revealed that all rounds had .passed over the target). Some started to return fire as they were engaged with small arms fire and the remainder continued the assault. Fortunately, at about this time, 102 Field Battery had been firing a contact mission, and the center of arc for this mission was over the center line of the enemy attack. Also, most of the gunners were still standing near their guns when the attack came in, and they were able to immediately engage the enemy over open sights.

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On instructions from Headquarters 1 RAR, soldiers within the mortar position were ordered to remain in their weapon pits and stay below ground level as the friendly artillery fire was being called in on the position.

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At this stage the mortar position was engaged with splintex by 102 Field Battery. The accuracy of their fire was revealed after the contact. Some enemy had attempted to drag away a complete mortar (which they couldn't dismantle), and their bodies and the mortar were found about five metres from the mortar pit. Several splintex darts had penetrated the barrel and also about 20% of the ammunition on the mortar line.

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At approximately 0230 hours 161 Field Battery was ordered to cease firing DFs in the area, and I RAR command post took control of the FSPB defence net and coordinated the efforts of Spooky (DC3 equipped with six mini guns) and LFT's firing in very close support of FSPB CORAL. These air activities continued until well after first light.

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Up until approximately 0700 hours the mortar position was shared by the enemy and the mortar men. Weapon pits and the soldiers had been sited in pairs, and the soldiers were made responsible for protecting each other. Periodically they were warned that friendly fire was being called in on the position and that they must remain in their pits for their own safety. On several occasions attempts were made at voice communication within the mortar position and between the base plate position and the gun position, but they were drowned by enemy heavy automatic fire.

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Throughout the attack, the 1 RAR Anti Tank Platoon, under the control of Headquarters 1 RAR, was firing across the flank of 102 Field Battery and the Mortar Platoon, using splintex and high explosive rounds. I 02 Field Battery had the problem of recapturing an overrun gun which was still in enemy hands. This was achieved by the GPO, and a section commander co-ordinating an attack (relying more on hand grenades than their personal weapons-F1's ), onto this gun which was rapidly recaptured. A detailed inspection of the gun showed that the enemy had tried to destroy it, but had only managed to damage one wheel and a trail.

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At approximately 0800 hours 13 May 1968, the enemy broke contact. They were observed as they withdrew and were engaged by artillery and tactical air strikes.

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A patrol from 102 Field Battery moved to the mortar position and assisted in moving the wounded to the gun position, and a clearing patrol from Head quarters I RAR and the Anti Tank Platoon then secured the position and cleared the perimeter. Sweeps of the area revealed the following enemy casualties--52 NVA KIA and one NVA PW, with 23 small arms and seven crew served weapons captured. Our own casualties were nine KIA, 28 WIA (this includes five KIA and eight WIA from I RAR Mortar Platoon strength of 18) with one 105 mm Howitzer and two 81 mm mortars damaged.

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Sweeps of the area, captured documents and PW interrogation revealed:

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• *Some of 102 Field Battery's aiming lights had been turned around and used to mark the direction of the enemy

• * Under the cover of darkness the enemy battalion had closed to within 250 meters of the FSPB and had dug in after a six hour forced march, undetected. This battalion, 275 Infiltration Group, had only recently arrived in the area, having left the Ho Chi Minh trail at the border 48hours beforehand and was en route for Saigon. They had been resting about 9000 metres away when the fly-in commenced, and had sent out a reconnaissance party to see what was going on. It would appear That they only saw the guns of 102 Field Battery and decided that they were a good opportunity target. This assessment was further indicated by the enemy surprise and confusion when they assaulted the Mortar Platoon position. They were on and through the position so quickly that they did not know what to do, and they started to discuss the matter at some length.

• * The enemy commander carried out his reconnaissance when the guns were laid on their center of arc (1600 mils), and he selected an FUP and center line at about right angles to that arc. Provided that the guns were still laid on their center of arc when the attack went in, the enemy would be on the position before the guns could be re-laid.

• For the remainder of 13 May 1968, the occupation of FSPB CORAL continued with the regrouping of 1 RAR, the arrival of Headquarters 1 ATF (Main) and two road convoys with TFMA personnel and stocks. Two sections of mortars from 3 RAR were placed under command of 1 RAR Mortar Platoon (all I RAR mortarmen except the second-in-command of Mortar Platoon and a Mortar Platoon signaller were evacuated to Nui Dat for a rest) until reinforcements arrived on I 4 May I 968.

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Also on I 3 May I 968, the Officer Commanding A Squadron 3 Cavalry Regiment was made responsible for the siting and defence of FSPB CORAL.

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At this time 3 RAR established FSPB COOGEE, and 161 Field Battery moved to that FSPB from their location 1200 meters West of FSPB CORAL.

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Throughout 14 and 15 May 1968 the development of the FSPB defences continued.

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At 0230 hours 16 May 1968, the enemy commenced a heavy mortar and RPG attack directed mainly at A Company I RAR and the Task Force Headquarters area. At 0240 hours, under the cover of this supporting fire, the enemy attacked both A Company and B Company, I RAR, in battalion strength. Although some of the forward pits of A Company were occupied by the enemy , the attack was held on the perimeter. The enemy broke contact at approximately 0340 hours. Throughout the attack the enemy continued to assault other parts of the perimeter.

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At 0515 hours, the enemy attempted to thrust between A Company and C Company through the Assault Pioneer Platoon, but this attack was prevented by mortar fire, Claymore and small arms fire. An attack was then mounted against all three companies, but this was also repulsed.

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At approximately 0645 hours, the enemy finally broke contact and withdrew. Their confusion was apparent from the air, and they were engaged by artillery and a number of tactical airstrikes. Neither cavalry nor infantry were deployed to pursue and harass them until 0815 hours, due to the fire support and air activity. Patrols later observed extensive digging in a creek bed about 1000 metres North of FSPB CORAL, Indicating that the enemy had prepared a position from which to launch attacks, and possibly to withdraw to, reorganise and lay up during the day.

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During the attack, the 1 RAR Mortar Platoon fired about 750 rounds from four mortars. Two mortars were mounted in APC's and two were on the ground, the latter two having to be rebedded twice.

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Spooky, LFT's and FGA aircraft supported the action. A significant first for 1 ATF was achieved during this attack with the employment of FGA aircraft at night by 1 RAR, using a pre-arranged visual reference point. The establishment of a corps artillery net on 12 May 1968, under the control of 11 FFV Artillery, also proved very successful, and it enabled rapid employment of the "Bien Hoa" heavy artillery.

Armoured Personnel Carriers and landrovers were used during the attack for ammunition resupply, and for the collection and evacuation of wounded to a central "Dustoff" point.

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Our total casualties were five KIA, 19 \VIA and two United States soldiers WIA. Sweeps conducted after first light revealed 34 NVA bodies, and indicated that more had been dragged away (this was confirmed by LFT pilots). One PW, 16 small arms and 11 crew served weapons were captured.

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On 17 May 1968, 1 RAR patrols located mortar base plate positions used during the night 15/16 May, and they also found quantities of ammunition. The enemy position had been heavily hit by I RAR mortars employed in the counter mortar fire role.

On 24 May 1968, 3 RAR abandoned FSPB COOGEE and moved by foot and air to AO Newport and established FSPB BALMORAL. 161 Field Battery moved by air to FSPB CORAL.

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FSPB CORAL received mortar, 75 mm RR and RPG fire from 0415 hours to 0430 hours on 28 May 1968. This was the last enemy attack on CORAL, and coincided with a battalion sized assault on FSPB BALMORAL.

FSPB BALMORAL was abandoned on 5 June1968, and FSPB CORAL was abandoned on 6 June 1968, without incident. However, during the period

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17 May to 5 June, all companies of I RAR were engaged in company group/armoured troop patrols in depth. There were a number of savage clashes with units of 7 NVA Division, during which many enemy, casualties were inflicted and weapons and equipment captured. FSPB CORAL was not attacked again during this period, indicating the success of these operations and the value of aggressive patrolling.

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The overall results of 1 RAR and 3 RAR's operations in AO Surfers 1 and 2 were;

• NVA (BC), 237

• Enemy KIA, possible 56

• PW , II (one VC and 10 NVA)

• Detainee, one

• Hoi Chanh, one

• Crew Served weapons, 35

• Individual weapons, 94